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I. Introduction
Public Interest Lawyering results from a decade-long effort by Alan K. Chen
and Scott Cummings, two former public interest lawyers. The authors go
beyond poverty practice and social justice litigation to evaluate public
interest lawyering as a field of scholarly inquiry. Their book maps a mature
field of study built on normative and empirical scholarship about the legal
profession’s relationship to the public interest and social change. This volume
will be a tremendous resource for those who teach and write in this area for
years to come. There is so much to admire it is difficult to know where to begin.
Addressing all of the book’s virtues would be an impossible task. Instead, I
focus on three things the authors do especially well: defining public interest
law, evaluating the pro bono contributions of the private bar, and canvassing
the rich empirical research in the field. These particular virtues distinguish the
book from its predecessors and contribute to its worth as a research tool and
teaching resource. I close with thoughts evoked by the book about modes of
public interest lawyering into the future.
II. Three Virtues of This Volume
A. Care in Defining Public Interest law
The book opens by taking on the most difficult question in the field:
defining public interest lawyering (5–32), a task that as often as not provokes
heated debate about the practical and normative boundaries of the field.1
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Are public interest lawyers only those who serve the poor? Does the label
extend to counsel for underrepresented constituencies? Who counts as
underrepresented? Racial minorities? Consumers? Tea Party members? Are
these constituencies underrepresented because of systemic disadvantage or
the failure of the democratic political process? Are they merely the current
losers in political or ideological battles? Are lawyers who represent important
causes, rather than clients, also engaged in public interest lawyering?
Consider, for example, former ACLU director Melvin Wulf’s statement that
his organization’s real client is the Bill of Rights (288). Who defines the
public interest? Is it hopelessly indeterminate? Does the public interest mean
anything other than the particular goals of an advocacy organization or activist
lawyer? You can see the problem.
Rather than taking the common route by acknowledging the diversity
of views and then choosing one “for the purposes of this book,” the
authors exhaustively review the literature about public interest lawyering’s
characteristics and defining features. They suggest that one way through the
thicket is to view public interest lawyering as a response to systemic failures in the
market, the political system and civil society (6–7). Market failures leave some
people without representation because they are too poor to afford a lawyer or
because their interests are too diffuse to overcome barriers to collective action
so they may pool resources to obtain representation. Consumers, for example,
may have widespread, diffuse, and relatively small individual claims that are
too expensive to justify individual litigation, yet their aggregate injuries may
be significant. Political failures, by contrast, occur when groups of citizens
are excluded from equal participation in the political process (215) and legal
action is needed to advance these groups’ collective interests.2 Civil society
failures flow from citizen disengagement or lack of participation in governance.
Although widely cited critiques by Theda Skocpol and Robert Putnam raise
concerns about Americans’ lack of civic engagement, scholars struggle to
identify institutional solutions.3 Some suggest that advocacy organizations,
including public interest law organizations, are a rational and effective form of
civic participation in a large, diverse society like the U.S (463–64).4
Hilbink, You Know the Type…: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 657
(2004); Legal Studies Division, Washington Legal Foundation, In Whose Interest? Public
Interest Law Activism in the Law Schools (1990).
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The authors do an admirable job grappling with the democratic tensions
inherent in defining and justifying public interest lawyering. The debate
over democratic legitimacy in particular raises complicated issues for lawyers
interested in bringing about social change (223–24). On the one hand, scholars
such as Francis Zemans argue that public interest litigation is a direct form
of political participation, accessible to the ordinary citizen, and therefore,
consistent with democracy.5 On the other hand, some (mostly conservative)
critics argue that policymaking through the courts circumvents representative
democracy and allows litigants to make important choices about governance
without electoral accountability.6 The distinction between lawyering for
social change and interest-group politics never has been easy to draw, but the
authors do an excellent job detailing and discussing characteristics that might
demarcate public interest lawyering. These characteristics include the need
to represent otherwise excluded viewpoints; the ability to and desirability of
challenging government overreach; the relative power disadvantage between
parties; the altruistic motivation of the attorneys or their moral commitment
to a cause; the physical location in which the lawyer practices, including an
organization’s nonprofit status; and the overarching goal of social change (8–
32). Not all of these criteria, the authors note, necessarily speak to the failures
of market, politics, or civil society.
Focusing on these systemic failures works well analytically to sharpen
the debate over what we might mean by public interest lawyering. It also,
however, could be viewed as an implicit argument that properly operating
market and political institutions are the appropriate venues for social struggle;
only when these avenues break down may public interest lawyers legitimately
step into the breach. Anarchists, revolutionaries, opponents of capitalism
and even some critical legal scholars may find this approach unsatisfying
because it leaves unchallenged the very market, political, and dare I say legal
institutions that they view as the source of injustice and inequality.7 Indeed,
social movement scholars long have discounted public interest lawyering as
elite contention within the existing system, rather than the more radical social
activism of storming the barricades or suffering arrest and imprisonment for
breaking unjust laws.8 I find this argument too dismissive; it certainly doesn’t
5.
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feel elite or mainstream to be the public interest lawyer in private negotiations,
Congress, or court. Nevertheless, there is an important normative tension here
between hewing to professional values and working toward transformative
social change.
The authors are well aware of this tension. In later chapters of the book,
they explore the tensions and contradictions of combining activism with
professional obligations and roles (293–97, 306–07, 356–67, 370–72). They
draw on an excerpt from Nancy Polikoff’s article, “Am I My Client? The
Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist,” to explore whether a lawyer can and
should combine the professional role of dispassionate counselor with the
lawyer’s own active participation in the movement (293–97). The authors
also explore more generally the role of lawyers in broader social movements
(461–63). At the end of this rich discussion, the authors wisely resist providing
a tidy model for public interest lawyering that reconciles radical advocacy
with legal representation. Throughout the volume, however, readers will find
fodder for discussion about how, and whether, radicalism and public interest
representation can be combined. I see this as a very desirable characteristic of
a text on public interest lawyering.
B. Attention to Public Interest Lawyering by the Private Bar
A second virtue of this book is how it recognizes that public interest
lawyering occurs in the private bar, as well as in nonprofit public interest
law organizations. The literature long neglected the contributions of private
pro bono and hybrid public interest-private practice firms to public interest
lawyering. That has begun to change.9 In my opinion, we do a disservice to our
students by portraying public interest lawyering as separate and different from
traditional private practice. This portrayal risks relieving private practitioners
from any sense of personal responsibility for the public interest (34), and too
often relegates public interest lawyering to the less prestigious margins of the
profession.10
This volume directly challenges the perception that public interest lawyering
primarily occurs in nonprofits. It documents the substantial contribution that
private lawyers make to pro bono representation and to access to justice. As
the authors note, this is a relatively new trend in the profession. Many large
Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Fellow Clergymen, April 16, 1963, Letter from
Birmingham Jail, available at http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/resources/article/
annotated_letter_from_birmingham.
9.

See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2004); Deborah
Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice: Public Service and the Professions (Stanford
Univ. Press 2005); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style
Civil Legal Assistance, 41 Law & Soc’y Rev. 79 (2007); Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather,
Private Lawyers & the Public Interest: The Evolving Role of Pro Bono in the Legal
Profession (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).

10.

See John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar
171 (rev. ed., Northwestern Univ. Press 1994).
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firms and even some private companies institutionalized pro bono programs
for their lawyers in response to decreasing governmental support for legal
services work; legislative restrictions on federal funded legal aid offices;
increased demand from nonprofit organizations for co-counsel relationships
with private lawyers; and the desire by junior associates for meaningful public
interest opportunities (170–73). Large firms now contribute extensively; Steven
Boutcher reports that law firms in the AmLaw 200 contributed more than 3.75
million pro bono hours in 2005 alone.11
Although the authors view these trends as positive for access to justice, they
do not romanticize pro bono representation by private lawyers. They take
an unflinching look at the challenges and conflicts that arise in this context,
including: declining large firm commitment to private pro bono during
economic downturns; accepting only those pro bono clients who avoid public
controversy and minimize positional conflicts with for-profit clients; selecting
cases based on lawyers’ interests rather than community needs; and the lack of
expertise among private lawyers in poverty or cause issues (173–81). Thus, the
book provides rich comparative material for considering how public interest
lawyering faces different challenges and constraints in private and nonprofit
settings. The discussion makes an important contribution to this literature and
to the field.
The material on private pro bono reflects the high quality scholarship of
Scott Cummings, a leading scholar on how the private bar contributes to
public interest lawyering.12 The book provides a vital discussion of the many
venues through which the legal profession increases access to justice and serves
the public interest. By broadening the perspective on pro bono, the authors
renew the idea that public service is a professional obligation of all lawyers,
not a task delegated to a few (54–56).13 Indeed, if the profession wishes to
preserve its legitimacy and autonomy, it must consider access to justice and
ethical lawyering beyond the interests of individual clients.
C. Review of the Rich Empirical Research in the Field
A third truly impressive aspect of this volume is the authors’ extensive
review of empirical research in the field to illustrate their points and to raise
important questions about public interest lawyering. Empirical research about
11.

Steven A. Boutcher, The Institutionalization of Pro Bono in Large Law Firms: Trends and
Variation Across the AmLaw 200, in Granfield & Mather, supra note 9, at 135, 144.

12.

See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 9; Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro
Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2357 (2010); Scott L. Cummings,
Access to Justice in the New Millennium: Achieving the Promise of Pro Bono, Human
Rights, Summer 2005, at 6–10.
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Louis Brandeis took this approach, arguing that private lawyers representing corporate
clients should serve as “lawyer for the situation,” providing guidance to their clients to make
decisions consistent with the public interest and to be sensitive to the societal implications
of their conduct. See the Chen and Cummings discussion of Brandeis’ view of the moral
obligation of lawyers to use their powers to protect the public interest (54–56).
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public interest lawyering has grown dramatically in recent years, along with
the trend toward empirical legal studies more generally. Some of this research
examines key questions or assumptions relevant to the profession. To what
extent do cause lawyers defer to the preferences and goals of their clients,
as professional ethics require? How do cause lawyers resolve ethical issues
when the interests of the client and the cause diverge? How do the narratives
of clients and lawyers about public-interest claims differ and why? These are
classic issues in public interest law practice, and the authors do a terrific job
of bringing to bear empirical research to think them through (especially in
Chapters 6 and 7).
Those teaching from this volume may wish to press their students as to
whether these questions are unique to public interest lawyers. Isn’t it possible
these same questions occur for lawyers representing private clients, too?
Defense firms, for example, may have a financial interest in prolonging
litigation, a stake that may conflict with their client’s desire to minimize
litigation costs and resolve a case quickly. Private clients of traditional
lawyers may feel that the legal narratives of their cases do not resemble their
understanding of the problems they bring their lawyers, just as public interest
clients do. Indeed, the broader research about the legal profession shows
agency problems and role conflict in for-profit as well as nonprofit settings.14
In this way, the book by Chen and Cummings presents an opportunity
to explore how many of these issues may be characteristic to lawyering, in
general, and not limited to nonprofit public-interest practice. This may seem
strange—to draw on a book about public interest lawyering to challenge the
received wisdom that its practitioners differ in important ways from ordinary
lawyers. But one way to undercut the claim that public interest lawyering is
contrary to professional norms is to ask if private lawyers actually conform to
these purported norms. Perhaps private lawyers look more like their public
interest counterparts than first appears. That’s a ripe topic for future empirical
research and this book provides a solid foundation for such study.
Even more interesting, at least to me, was the authors’ review of empirical
research showing how public interest lawyering has expanded and changed.
The authors make a significant contribution with their discussion of research
about the rise of public interest law firms on the political right (100–15). To their
credit, they resist the temptation to exclude conservative cause lawyers from
the definition of public interest lawyering; instead, they give this development
careful and appropriate attention. They show that conservative public interest
lawyers exhibit a diversity of causes and intra-movement divisions similar to
their progressive counterparts (112–15). They note how the growing ideological
diversity of public interest law organizations raises important issues about the
interaction between politics and cause lawyering (95–96, 116–21).
14.

See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 457
(2000).
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In short, the book is a treasure trove of empirical work on public interest
lawyering. The literature it reviews spans a range of topics, from the macro of
public interest law firm organization to the micro of lawyer-client relations.
This feature truly sets it apart from other volumes about this field.
III. The Changing Reality of Public Interest Lawyering
It seems fitting to conclude by raising important questions about the
models and philosophies of public interest lawyering so meticulously explored
in this book. There are many ways to slice the field based on lawyers’ activities
including, direct services and impact litigation; litigation, community
economic development or community organizing; and legislative and policy
advocacy and test litigation. There also are many contested models for public
interest lawyers’ relationships with their clients, including, to name a few,
conventional client-lawyer relations; client-centered lawyering; or grassroots
community lawyering oriented toward empowerment. Those teaching from
this book will appreciate the authors’ careful attention to how each of these
forms speaks to core values of client autonomy, lawyer accountability and
legitimacy and access to justice (275–79, 281–90, 292–302, 318–27). Important
trade-offs occur among these models of representation; the materials in this
volume lay the foundation for a rich discussion of those choices.
That said, the understandable need to draw out the distinctive features of
these models for teaching purposes tends to emphasize the differences among
them rather than to evaluate how these differences were socially constructed.
Many divides in the field reflect a history of conflict and struggle. They tell of
political opposition to public interest representation and the Legal Services
Corporation, hostility toward cause lawyers taking advantage of “activist
judges” to make policy, and frustration on the part of powerful and dominant
interests with advocates’ success in the courts.15 These struggles shaped the
field through outside forces rather than internal reflection and the models or
modes of lawyering reflect these pressures.
Those teaching with this volume may wish to ask students whether the
models and modes of public interest lawyering advanced by scholars are
enduring categories or the product of how the field developed. To take just one
example, legal services lawyers’ apparent emphasis on direct services rather
than open pursuit of social-change litigation is as much a matter of politics
and self-preservation as it is a philosophical position on the practice of public
interest law. Indeed, in the early days of the Legal Services Corporation, lawyers
adopted an explicit law reform strategy that included complex litigation on
novel legal theories, class actions and extensive appellate litigation, including
70 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court between 1967 and 1973.16 Their
15.

See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest
Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why it Matters for Social Change, Law &
Soc. Inquiry (forthcoming 2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
lsi.12013/pdf.
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Id. at 4.
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remarkable success, however, created a backlash from business interests and
powerful political actors who sought to limit their ability to pursue social
change.17 In the 1980s, legal service organizations came under attack. Congress
dramatically cut funding and imposed severe restrictions on the activities of
legal services lawyers, which changed their practice dramatically.18
This history gives context to these categories, which embody the struggles
that accompanied the development of the field. The divide between direct
services and impact litigation, from this perspective, is less a natural cleavage
than the product of political backlash in which powerful actors used the
state to restrict the scope of social change litigation on behalf of poor clients.
This history shows how political forces shaped the models of public interest
lawyering that we see today.
Wise teachers also might ask students to discuss how modern dynamics are
breaking down the barriers among these models of public interest lawyering,
and, perhaps, creating new ones. Indeed, the book concludes with a call for
more integration among the various strategies employed by public interest
lawyers (515–24). What would an integrative vision of public interest lawyering
look like? As professors, how might we teach such a thing? Throughout the
book, the authors provide numerous examples indicating that practice is
moving in this direction. They note how pro bono representation has become
integrated into private practice through big firm programs and small firm
low bono representation (170–200). They also note how lawyers increasingly
integrate litigation strategies with community organizing, legislative advocacy
and other tactics. Lawyers also are developing new strategies, such as
community economic development (233–44). Modern public interest lawyers
need to think outside the box to continue to serve their clients, communities
and causes. This volume is a tremendous resource for making that happen.
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